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The entry into force of the World Trade Organization  Agreement  on January  1, 1995
culminated  nearly a decade  of negotiations  aimed  at restructuring  the liberal  international
trading system.  These negotiations  were in many ways more successful than knowledgeable
observers had expected.  A single integrated  rule system was adopted in place of the General
Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade  [GATT]  a la carte. Services,  investment  measures  and
intellectual property rights protection were the subject of new area agreements.  Hard-fought
inroads into agricultural protectionism were made.  The dispute settlement  system was revised
in important ways.
Many  of the  changes  brought  about  by the Uruguay  Round  [UR]  negotiations  were
intended to  address  perceived  defects  in the legal  structure  of the GATT.  The  changes
addressed  perceptions that the GATT was insufficiently law based; that it operated  on the
basis of the effective economic and political power of its members, and dealt unfairly with the
interests  of members  lacking  effective  bargaining  power.  The United  States  [US]  had
unilaterally adopted  GATT-inconsistent  measures  with virtual impunity;  redress  against it
other than by the European Union [EU] and Japan was politically impracticable.
Dissatisfaction  with the  legal  character  of the  GATT  was  not  limited  to  developing
countries and NICs.  The Japanese were  anxious to  strengthen  GATT rule  enforcement.
Japan operates outside a formal regional integration mechanism like the European Community
[EC] Treaty or North American Free Trade  Agreement [NAFTA].  Regional  structures will
provide fallback trade environments if the global trading system becomes  unglued. Japan does
not have this fallback.  It has become essential to Japan to assure that the multilateral trading
system continues to function effectively.  The Japanese government perceived that the GATT
would best serve its interests  as a more enforceable  set of rules.'
The  enhanced  "legalization"  of the  GATT  system  as embodied  in the  World  Trade
Organization  [WTO]  may be described  as a transition from a "soft  law"  to  a "hard  law"
system.  The term "soft law" has been used by international  lawyers for a number of years to
characterize  legal norms that do not effectively compel compliance.  Examples  of soft  law
include  various  United Nations  [UN]  General  Assembly  Resolutions  that urge  states  to
behave in one way or another, but do not provide a concrete basis for enforcement  through
the International Court of Justice or UN Security Council.  The term "soft law" has also been
used  to  describe  some  of the  results of the  1992  Rio  Conference  on Environment  and
Development.  At  that  conference,  governments  adopted  a  number  of  non-binding
1These views  were conveyed  to the author in interviews with government officials  in Japan
in  1993.  Frederick M.  Abbott,  Law  and Policy  of Regional  Integration: The NAFTA  and
Western Hemispheric Integration in the World Trade Organization System (1995),  Ch. 8.
33declarations,  including  the  Rio  Declaration  on Environment  and  Development.  The  Rio
Declaration is ascribed a soft law character because it does not impose the type of concrete
legal  obligations  on its  adherents  that would  be  imposed  by  a treaty.2  The  GATT  1947
General Agreement is of course a treaty,  and it does impose specific legal obligations  on its
members.  A characterization  of the GATT  1947 as  soft law should not be understood to
equate  it  to  a  UN  General  Assembly  Resolution  or  the  Rio  Declaration.  A  soft  law
characterization  of the GATT  1947, though  perhaps imprecise,  is  intended to reflect  the
operational reality of the GATT from 1947 through the UR.3
The seminal description.of the GATT as a soft-law system is in Olivier Long's Law and
Its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trading  System.4  Long,  a former GATT Director-
General,  suggested  that the GATT functioned  effectively  as  an international  organization
because its Members  chose to operate through  a flexible process of political bargaining  as
opposed to demanding attention to a fixed set of rules.  If the demands of a block of Members
were  inconsistent  with  existing  rules,  new  rules would  be  fashioned.5  If the  express
mechanisms  for amending  the General  Agreement  appeared  inconvenient,  a  new and less
demanding  amendment  mechanism  might  be  employed.'  Disputes  were  resolved  by
consensus  and not by the imposition of measures on a recalcitrant  member.
"Hard  law"  refers  to  a  system  of norms  to  which  a  relatively  high  expectation  of
compliance exists.  The changes brought about by the entry into force of the WTO Agreement
may be characterized  as part of a transition of the GATT/WTO from a soft law to a hard law
system.'  The principal  evidence of this trend may be found in two areas.  The first is in the
2Ulrich Beyerlin,  "The Concept of Sustainable Development,"  in Enforcing Environmental
Standards (Rudiger Wolfrum  ed.  1996 forthcoming). Beyerlin  does not expressly adopt the
"soft law" terminology,  referring instead to the concept of sustainable  development  as "an
overall political aim which all actors in the field of international environmental  protection and
development  have to respect."
31n its seminal decision denying the GATT a self-executing character,  the European Court of
Justice  emphasized  the character  of the  GATT  as  a  forum for  reciprocal  bargaining,  as
opposed to  a fixed  set of rules.  International Fruit  Company N.V.  v. Produktschap  voor
Groenten en Fruit No. 3), Case 21-24/72, Court of Justice of the European  Communities,
Dec.  12,  1972.
4Olivier Long, Law and Its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trading System (1985).
5As in the case of special and differential treatment for developing countries.
6As in the case of the consensus framework agreements used to conclude part of the Tokyo
Round negotiations.
7The movement of the GATT/WTO from a soft to a hard law system might be understood to
manifest itself in a number of ways. The creation of the single integrated system, for example,
might be understood to evidence the trend by eliminating the optional character of many sets
of rules.  Rules  are  now  applicable  to  a  greater  number  of parties.  However,  the mere
extension of norms to a wider group of parties does not necessarily signal an enhancement
in the expectation that norms will be complied with.
34progressive  refinement  of rules  from the  general  to the  specific.  The  second  is  in the
transformation of the dispute settlement  system from consensus-based to quasi-judicial.  These
two  manifestations  have  occurred  to  some  extent  independently  of one  another.  The
phenomenon of rule refinement has been underway since the founding of the GATT, and was
a  major  theme  of the  Tokyo  Round  negotiations  which  culminated  in  1979.8  The
transformation  of the dispute settlement  system in the conclusion  of the UR, on the other
hand,  represented  a sharp break with the consensus practice that had evolved  since  1947.
The overarching  goal of the WTO  system is the progressive worldwide  elimination  of
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services.  Underlying the WTO system is
the economic theory of comparative  advantage  holding that  as individual  nations  allocate
production to their comparatively  most  efficient  sectors,  and trade with other nations  for
efficiently produced goods, global wealth creation will be optimized.  The question naturally
arises whether a hard law multilateral trading system is more likely than a soft law system to
optimize the free movement of goods and services,  and reduce trade barriers.  The intuitive
answer to this question is "yes,"  since a hard law system should be assumed to enhance the
prospects of compliance with specific  rules.  On the other hand, there are several  variables
that raise doubts.  The establishment of a hard law framework may, at least in the short term,
increase the frequency of disputes;  it may reduce the likelihood that governments  will accept
new commitments;  it may increase the likelihood that disputes will lead to  a breakdown in
inter-governmental  relations,  and; it may not in fact result in compliance (a result  suggested
by the US-Japan automobile dispute).  Moreover,  hard law  is not necessarily good  law --
specific  and enforceable rules may not have been designed to reduce barriers to trade.
This paper  examines the transition of the GATT/WTO  from a soft law to  a hard law
system, and makes some tentative suggestions  about the potential economic implications of
this transition.  It suggests  that, on the whole, the transition  should tend to enhance  global
economic  efficiency  by reducing the transactions  costs associated  with international  trade.
However, there are many uncertainties inherent in this conclusion. Moreover,  the creation of
a hard law system in the WTO is but one of a number of important developments  that will
influence the flow of trade.
Two contemporaneous trends outside the movement from a soft to a hard law system will
significantly determine the capacity of the institution to reduce barriers to trade.  The first is
the simultaneous evolution of competing regional rules systems,  such as the EU and NAFTA,
which may threaten the integrity of the WTO rule  system.  The second, and perhaps  more
important, is the potential incorporation of new and powerful  state actors such as the People's
Republic of China [PRC] and Russia into the WTO  system.  The politics of the WTO system
will be realigned as these new state actors add their voices to the system, and it is open to
question  whether  these  voices  will  be  reading  from  the  Organization  for  Economic
8Rule refinement does not always result in a significant reduction of the level of discretion
allowed  to  national  governments,  as  evidenced  to  some  extent  by  the  Sanitary  and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement.  In the concluding stage of the UR this agreement was
modified to facilitate deviations from internationally-agreed  norms.
35Cooperation and Development  [OECD] book of verses.  The combination of a new hard law
approach, the ascendence of regionalism,  and major state actors with economic perspectives
decidedly different from that of the US and EU, may result  in a substantial  challenge to the
functioning of the WTO  system.
From Soft Law to Hard Law
The Refinement of Rules
The GATT General Agreement as adopted in  1947 contained  a set of general principles
drafted  at a fairly high level of abstraction.  The two most important general principles, the
most favored  nation  [MFN] 9 and  national treatment  principles1 °  in theory  are capable  of
application in the most diverse circumstances.  However,  in neither case has the application
of the general rule proven straightforward.  In part this is because the General  Agreement
itself contains exceptions  from the general  principles,  and the  inter-action  of the general
principle and the exception gives rise to complications.  In part this is because  parties may in
good faith differ as to the intent of the general principle in a specific  case.
To illustrate with respect to exceptions,  GATT Article  XXIV establishes  an exception
from the MFN  principle to permit the creation of customs union and free trade areas.11  While
the MFN  principle itself is relatively straightforward, the customs union exception  is not,  and
interpretation of the customs union exception  has been problematic since the founding of the
GATT.  In order to resolve some of the ambiguities surrounding the customs union exception,
the UR negotiations included  an Understanding on Article XXIV which seeks to clarify the
meaning of certain of its terms.  The Understanding with respect to Article XXIV is  quite a
bit lengthier than Article XXIV  itself,  and would have been much longer except  for the fact
that it incorporates by reference  certain tariff averaging procedures followed by the GATT
Secretariat in the UR negotiations.12
Good faith differences of opinion with respect to the application of general principles,  and
the resulting need to reduce the scope of permissible interpretation,  are a more prevalent basis
9General  Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade  1994 [hereinafter  GATT],  art. I, in World Trade
Organization,  The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral  Trade Negotiations:  The
Legal Texts (1995). 1GATT,  art. III.
l1Other examples  are the tension between  the MFN  principle  and the  exception for  less
developed countries  and the prohibition of export subsidies and the expectation for exports
of primary products.  The problem of interpreting exceptions  in relation to rules has led to
some of the most intense and long lasting GATT disputes.
12Regarding  Article XXIV,  the Understanding  regarding Article  XXIV,  and new General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)  Article V governing regional services agreements,
Frederick  M. Abbott,  Law and Policy of Regional  Integration:  The NAFTA and Western
Hemispheric Integration in the World Trade Organization System (1995), pp. 35-54.
36for the  addition  of specifics  to the GATT.  The national  treatment  principle  is  frequently
invoked in dispute  settlement proceedings.  A GATT Member is expected to treat imported
products on the same basis as domestically-produced  products for the purposes of internal
sale.  For good reason, formally identical treatment of domestic and imported products is not
required.  A  government  may  require  that  certain  agricultural  procedures  are  followed
domestically  to protect  the health of humans  or  animals,  and  the  same  government  may
require the border inspection of  like imported products to assure equivalent  safety.  The goal
of  the regulations is the same, i.e.,  protection of health at an equivalent level.  The application
of different rules to imported like products is not contrary to the national treatment principle
unless the aim and effect of the import regulations  is to afford a competitive  advantage to
domestic production.13  The desire to avoid the inherent  uncertainties  in determining whether
import regulations are the equivalent of domestic regulations has caused governments to seek
in the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  [SPS] Agreement to establish specific  rules as to
how import measures are adopted, to assure the transparency of rules,  and to govern the way
these rules are applied.14
Articles  VI and XVI of the GATT established rules with respect to the  application of
antidumping and countervailing  duty measures.  By the time the Tokyo Round negotiations
were initiated,  it was apparent to many GATT Member governments that these rules allowed
too much  flexibility in the determination of dumping and subsidization, and so efforts were
undertaken to add specificity,  such as by clarifying the method by which material injury to
domestic industries would be determined.  The adoption of these more specific  rules in the
Tokyo Round  did not accomplish  a great deal  in terms  of minimizing  inter-governmental
friction in the context of dumping and subsidization,  so efforts to further clarify rules were
pursued in the UR. In the new Agreement  on Application of GATT Article VI a higher level
of detail is added, for example, with respect to the rates of exchange to be used in comparing
export price and normal value."  Likewise, the Agreement on Subsidies added a substantially
higher level of detail regarding what types of subsidies may be countervailed  against.16
Economics is a largely quantitative  science.  If tariff A is reduced by x percent,  and if the
elasticities  of supply and demand  are y and z,  and if exchange rates are held  constant, then,
all other things  being equal,  there will be an increase  in imports of q.  Quantitative  analysis
of course has its limits.  Services  barriers  are difficult  to quantify,  elasticities are difficult to
measure,  and all other things are often not  equal.  Human behavior  plays  a central role in
determining  economic events. While economists  attempt to quantify human propensities  --
as,  for example,  with  consumer sentiment  surveys  and  indices  --  difficulties  in  predicting
13For an explanation of  the National Treatment principle, see the GATT panel report in United
States Taxes on Automobiles.
1 4Agreement  on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures [hereinafter  SPS's
Agreement],  at Annex C.
X 5Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of  the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, at art. 2.4.1  [hereinafter Agreement  on Dumping].
1 6Agreement  on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, arts. 3-8.
37human behavior hinder the ability of economists to make accurate forecasts.'
7  The same kinds
of indeterminacies  inherent in individual human behavior are inherent  in governmental  or state
behavior.  The reaction of one government to the trade measures of another government  may
principally depend on predictions regarding quantifiable economic effects.  However there are
more subjective factors that may also influence or determine reactions, including the political
history of relations  between  the  governments,  perceived  national  security  concerns,  and
domestic political variables.'8  For this reason, "political economics"  may be the discipline  that
best suits an analysis of the potential  impact of the new WTO agreements on administered
barriers to trade.
The WTO Agreements  on SPS, Dumping and  Subsidies, as well as the agreements  with
respect to fields such as technical barriers to trade, valuation for customs purposes, rules of
origin and import licensing procedures,  establish specific rules with respect to the operation
of "administered barriers to trade" as those terms are used in the context of this conference.
The objective of the negotiators of these agreements was to clarify the application of GATT
general  principles  (such as the national treatment  principle)  in the relevant  subject  matter
areas,  and to limit the discretion of national and regional administrators in the implementation
of rules.  The goal of limiting  discretion was not,  however,  pursued without  objection  or
qualification.
A useful illustration of the tendency to qualification  is in a provision regarding dispute
settlement  in the Agreement  on Dumping.  If a Dispute  Settlement Understanding  [DSU]
panel  finds that there  is "more  than  one permissible  interpretation"  of the Agreement  on
Dumping, and a complained-against Member's administrative  measures are in conformity with
one permissible  interpretation, then those measures will be considered  consistent with the
Agreement. 1 9  The implication of this provision is that WTO Members did not in fact agree
on  a  single  set of rules  governing  the application  of antidumping  measures,  but  instead
achieved  an  agreement  with  multiple  meanings  that  may  be  adjusted  to  suit  individual
Members.  There is some considerable concern among GATT legal scholars with respect to
this provision.  It seems to be inconsistent  with general  principles of treaty  interpretation
which assume that the meaning of terms  can be definitively  ascertained.  A provision that
" 7Brookings Report on External Balances. " 8Law is a largely  subjective  science. Human behavior  is often difficult to predict,  and the
outcome  of legal  measures  is  inherently  uncertain.  For  example,  it  may  be  intuitively
postulated that the degree to which a law will control behavior is directly  dependent on the
intensity of the sanctions and enforcement mechanisms that accompany the law. Nevertheless,
even the most extreme sanctions  do not assure compliance with law. Murder occurs even if
capital punishment is certain and drug traffickers continue to ply their trade in countries where
they face virtually certain execution if caught. Economists certainly recognize that a general
analysis of the effect of the economic effects of  the WTO agreements on administered barriers
to trade  will  involve  a great number  of variables  and  must  account  for  a  great  deal  of
uncertainty, including the uncertainties inherent in unpredictable human (and governmental)
behavior.
1 9Agreement  on Dumping, art.  17.6(ii); see Croley and Jackson, in Petersmann.
38permits individual WTO Members to adopt different interpretations  of the same text suggests
some of the  difficulties that  may be inherent in attempting  to ascribe or predict  economic
effects  with respect  to  the  WTO  agreements  governing  administered  barriers  to  trade.
Predicting  the  effects  of the  agreements  is  hampered  by uncertainties  in  the agreements
themselves.
The  most significant  movement  toward  the  creation  of specific  or  hard  rules  in  the
GATT/WTO  system occurred in connection with the Agreement  on Trade-Related  Aspects
of Intellectual  Property  Rights  [TRIPS  Agreement].  In  the  TRIPS  Agreement,  WTO
Members  largely abandoned  the historical practice of leaving to individual governments the
choice  of mechanisms  used  to  fulfill  their  GATT  obligations,  and  specified  both  strict
minimum substantive standards of intellectual property rights  [IPRs]  protection  and the legal
mechanisms for enforcing those standards that Member  governments must maintain.20  The
TRIPS Agreement reflects a significant degree of skepticism  among OECD  governments that
a soft law system in the area of IPRs protection would be adequate to protect their perceived
interests.  The hard law of the  specific TRIPS  substantive  standards,  and the potential  for
imposition of trade sanctions against transgressors,  would be more suited to their purposes.
The often-cited  length of the final WTO Agreement  as some 25,000 pages is deceptive
since  this  includes  the  tariff  schedules  of the  members.  The  basic  texts,  standing  at
approximately  500 pages, nevertheless represent a significantly more detailed set of rules for
the governance of the multilateral trading  system than the GATT  1947  and Tokyo  Round
agreements.  Taken as a whole,  these texts evidence  a trend toward the application of harder
law in the WTO.
From Consensus to Quasi-Judicial  Dispute Settlement
The WTO  Agreement  has  transformed  the GATT  dispute  settlement  system from  a
consensus-based  system to a quasi-judicial  system.  Both the old and new systems derive from
Article XXIII of the GATT  which  generally  provided for a system of consultation, to  be
followed  by recommendations  from the Members  as  appropriate,  to  authorization  of the
withdrawal of trade concessions as required.21  The basic Article XXIII provisions evolved
over time into a panel dispute settlement system which was codified  in a  1979 Understanding
on  Dispute  Settlement.  In  this  system,  the  GATT  Council  received  complaints  from
Members, and could agree by consensus to establish a panel of experts, generally consisting
of three individuals, who were charged with drafting a report with respect to a dispute.  The
report  might  make recommendations  concerning  measures to be taken  by  a  complained-
against  Member in order to conform  its rules to the GATT.  In order for the report of the
panel to be binding on a complained-against Member, the GATT  Council was required to
adopt the report by a consensus of its Members, including the complained-against  Member.
2 0Agreement  on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
21Robert Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law (1993),  and Pierre Pescatore,  William
Davey,  and  Andreas  Lowenfeld,  Handbook  of GATT  Dispute  Settlement  (1991,  and
updates).
39Although this system of dispute  settlement appears to have functioned  effectively for much
of recent GATT history,22 there was a perception that the consensus-based  system resulted
in the the failure to establish panels and avoidance of panel rulings,23 and that the  system was
therefore insufficiently law-based.
The DSU24 adopted in connection with the conclusion of the UR substantially alters the
prior GATT dispute settlement  practice.25  The DSU applies to the settlement of disputes
under all of  the multilateral trade agreements [MTAs].  Following a mandatory consultation
period,  a panel of experts will be appointed  by the WTO Secretariat  (or Director-General  if
necessary),  unless  the  Dispute  Settlement  Body  [DSB]  votes  by  consensus  against  the
establishment  of a panel.26  The report of the panel will be adopted by the DSB unless there
is a consensus vote against adoption,  or unless a disputing party appeals the decision to the
newly created Appellate Body.  If an appeal is undertaken,  the ruling of the Appellate Body
is  adopted by the DSB, unless there  is a  consensus against  adoption.  Since there  is little
prospect that  a consensus will  exist  against  the adoption  of a report,2 7 for  all  intents and
purposes the adoption of panel reports is now automatic.
The automatic  adoption of panel reports is coupled with other important features of the
new DSU. The DSU makes clear that Members  are expected to resolve disputes involving
interpretation  and application  of WTO  rules,  or "impediment[s]  to  the attainment  of any
objective  of the  covered  agreements,"  under  the  rules  and  procedures  of the  DSU.28
Moreover,  a Member  is not to impose trade  sanctions  on another  Member for an alleged
violation of WTO rules without the authorization of the DSB.29  The DSU thus generally
prohibits the unilateral imposition of trade sanctions.  The adoption of rules prohibiting the
unilateral  imposition  of trade  sanctions  was directed towards  the US  and  its  Section  301
22Hudec, id.
3In fact, the adoption of a number of important panel reports rendered  during the Uruguay
Round negotiations,  including the two Tuna panel reports, the Cafe Standards and Banana
reports, was blocked. However, the reports may, in part,  have been blocked on the grounds
that the subject matter would be addressed as part of the bargaining at the completion of the
Round.  So that,  in  a sense,  the claimed  ineffectiveness  of the panel procedure  was a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
24Understanding  on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
25Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization
and the Evolution of the  GATT Dispute Settlement  System Since  1948,  31  CMLR  1157
(1994).
26The DSB is the General Council of the WTO sitting under a different name.
27The only foreseeable basis for a consensus against adoption is that the prevailing party will
choose not to pursue its remedies.  However,  since that party is entitled to withdraw  its
complaint  at any time, there is no foreseeable reason why it would permit the report to be
brought before the DSB, only to vote against it.
28DSU, art. 23:1.
291d. art. 23:2(c).
40legislation which  sets up the US Trade Representative's  Office  as prosecutor, judge, and
executioner with respect to the trade-related practices  of foreign governments.30
The  dispute  settlement  procedure  of the  GATT  1947  involved  a  political  negotiation
directed at achieving  a consensus  among the disputing Members.  Although this procedure
may  have been  largely  successful  in resolving  disputes,  it  lacked  the  legal  character  of a
judicial  procedure.  A judicial  procedure  requires  that  the  decision-making  function  be
performed by a neutral  decision-maker,  i.e., one without a direct interest  in the outcome  of
the dispute.  The assumption underlying the judicial procedure  is that the law applicable to
the parties will govern the outcome of the dispute,  and  not the self-interest  of the parties.
Under  the  GATT  1947  system,  the interests  of the  Members  and  the  willingness  of the
Members to make concessions with respect to those interests were central to the outcome of
a dispute.
The WTO DSU removes WTO Members from the center of the decision-making  function
by  making the  establishment  of panels and the adoption of panel reports  automatic.  The
panels  and Appellate Body assume the role of primary decision-makers.  Since panels  are
appointed on a case by case basis, the panelists act in the capacity of arbitrators  rather than
judges.  Members of the Appellate Body serve for extended terms and have the independent
character  of appellate  judges.  On the  whole,  it  seems  fitting  to  refer  to  the  new  DSU
procedure as "quasi-judicial."  The underlying assumption of the new WTO system is that the
law is the master of the Members.  The outcome of a dispute settlement procedure  should
not,  at least nominally, be based on a political negotiation.
Soft Law to Hard  Law
It may be that a flexible  soft-law character of the GATT was suitable from  1947 to the
mid-1980s,  when the global trading system was dominated by the US and the EU.  Effective
power  in the multilateral trading system of the 1990s is more diffuse,  and disputes may not
be as easily settled as they were in the past.  For this and other reasons,  the soft-law  system
may  have  outlived  its usefulness.  The trend from  a flexible  to  a fixed  law  system in  the
GATT/WTO is clear in the progression from GATT 1947 to the Tokyo Round to the UR.
It is nevertheless not clear yet whether the new hard law system will be effective.  There  exist
alternatives  to  the  widely  inclusive  WTO  system  in  the  form  of increasingly  large  and
powerful regional trading systems in which states may share more complementary  interests,
and in which states may be more amenable to complying with hard legal rules.
The Economics  of the Hard Law System
Since this is a distinguished  audience of professional economists,  I will not attempt to
impress  you  with my  mastery of the economic  sciences.  I will  confine  myself to  some
30Robert E. Hudec, "Thinking  About the New  Section  301:  Beyond  Good  and Evil,"  in
Aggressive Unilateralism (Jagdesh Bhagwati and Hugh T. Patrick, eds.  1990).
41tentative suggestions  or observations regarding the economic  implications  of the transition
of the  WTO to  a hard law  system,  and hope  that these  observations  may stimulate  some
useful reflections.
Transactions  Costs and the Multilateral  Trading System
The economic goal of trade liberalization is the enhancement of global efficiencies in the
production and distribution of goods and services, i.e., the promotion of wealth creation (and,
with  appropriate  social welfare planning, an equitable  distribution of the wealth  created).  I
will  for  the  time  being  put  aside  the  vital  question  of social  welfare  protection  and
enhancement  that may interfere  with pure economic  efficiency,  recognizing that  efficiency
without welfare is not a desirable goal.  Thus,  I will invoke the preamble of the economist --
I will assume a world in which maximizing economic  efficiency in the production of goods
and services is the desired goal.
It  appears well  accepted  in economics  literature  that transactions  costs  are a  drag  on
efficiency.  I believe  that one of the principal  observations  of Coase was that under  free
bargaining  conditions  legal  rules  are  largely  unimportant  in  determining  the  level  of
production in an economy since rational economic actors will bargain around legal rules that
allocate production inefficiently.  Coase suggested that transactions  costs associated with the
bargaining process may have a significant impact  on economic  efficiency.31  He recognized
that  legal  rules  may substantially  affect  the  distribution  of wealth created  by  productive
activities,  even if not the level of production itself.  If Coase is correct about the importance
of transactions costs,  which I believe  he is, then one important economic  goal of any legal
system -- including  a multilateral  trading system -- will be to reduce the transactions costs
associated with bargaining around rules.
It would be  a  tremendously  interesting  exercise to  construct  and test an international
trading system model based on Coase's hypothesis that reduction of transactions  costs is the
prerequisite of efficiency -- and perhaps someone in this audience will know if this has already
been  done  -- but it would  not be  easy.  Coase  highlights  that  wealth  transfers  between
economic  actors  must  be  used  as  bargaining  tools  to  permit  the  efficient  allocation  of
production.  The international  economic  system can be highly resistant to wealth transfers,
and  bargaining  around  inefficient  legal  rules  may  be  exceedingly  difficult.  Thus  the
international  economic  system  has  certain  inherent  obstacles  to  optimum  allocation  of
productive resources that may not be overcome by foreseeable bargaining. Regrettably, I will
not be able to lay out a detailed Coasian model of multilateral trading behavior in this paper.
However, I wish to expand on one simple idea:  that legal rules which can be applied with
lower transactions costs are more economically efficient than legal rules which impose higher
transactions costs.  Assume that two countries would trade x volume of goods in period  1.
The exchange of goods would reduce production costs in both countries by y amount.  Delays
in transaction  processing  imposed by bargaining  over the terms  of trade during  period  1
31 Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost,"  3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960).
42would  reduce  the  amount  of efficiency  gains  in production  by  some  amount  z  (thereby
reducing y).
If the bargaining  in period  1 results in a reduction in trade barriers that enhances future
economic  efficiencies,  then production cost  savings in future  periods  (e.g.,  period  2) will
result. A future cost of yl will be saved in time period 2,  but z will nevertheless  have been lost
in period  1.
The intuitive  assumption  is,  I believe,  that hard legal  rules  will,  all  other things being
equal,  reduce the amount z.  The operation of a hard legal  system should reduce delays in
transaction processing by reducing the number of disputes  concerning the application of rules,
or by reducing the time spent in resolving disputes, that is, reducing bargaining or transactions
costs. 32  The  straightforward  hypothesis is that the transition of the WTO  to a hard legal
system will  reduce the frequency  and duration of trade  disputes,  and thereby improve the
efficiency  characteristics  of the multilateral trading system.  The reality, of course, is not  so
simple.
First, the parties that argue trade disputes in the WTO are governments,  while the parties
that  engage in trade are largely  private enterprises.  Therefore,  there may not be a strong
correlation between the frequency and duration of trade disputes settled within the WTO and
the  economic  activity of private enterprises.  If government  A and government  B  dispute
whether a particular  agricultural inspection method violates the SPSs Agreement,  this may
not have an impact,  or may have only a modest impact,  on agricultural imports and  exports
during the prosecution of the dispute.  Thus, reducing the frequency or duration of disputes
within the WTO may have little or no direct effect on the activities  of producers  of goods and
services,  and therefore little or no effect on the efficient  allocation of productive resources.
On the other hand, private enterprises may be affected during the prosecution of disputes,
and such parties may refrain  (by choice  or necessity) from  engaging  in trade  transactions
pending the resolution of disputes.  Take the cattle growth hormone dispute between the US
and the EU as an example.  This inter-governmental  dispute has had a significant impact on
exporters  and importers,  and  has  affected  the volume  of transactions  during the  dispute.
Similarly,  the dispute concerning  the EU banana  regulations  has  significantly  affected  the
volume and direction of trade in bananas during the dispute.  An expeditious resolution of the
dispute presumably would restore some or all of the lost volume of trade.  Since the EU has
blocked  two banana  panel  decisions under the  old  "soft"  GATT  system that would have
caused  it to reduce  its  barriers,  and  since  the  new  "hard"  system would  not tolerate  the
blocking of panel  decisions, this is a case in which the hypothetical capacity of the new  system
to reduce transactions costs is perhaps illustrated.
Second, in the short term at least, the new hard law system of trade regulation and dispute
settlement may well result in increased recourse to WTO dispute settlement as compared with
32While these observations could be framed  in the form of a mathematical formula, I doubt
that such an exercise would serve any useful purpose.
43the prior GATT system.  The new dispute settlement  system does not require the consent  of
the complained-against party in order to proceed. With this obstacle to dispute settlement (at
both the initiation and conclusion phase) removed,  WTO Members may be more inclined to
pursue dispute  settlement.  The political negotiation previously  involving the complained-
against party is no longer an obstacle.  Japan, for example, has signaled its intention to more
actively pursue trade dispute settlements in the WTO.
Nevertheless,  it may be that more frequent recourse to WTO dispute settlement will result
in the more expeditious  settlement of trade disputes  (which may not previously have been
brought  into  the GATT),  and  thereby result  in a reduction  in overall  inter-governmental
transactions costs. With only a soft law system of dispute settlement, the parties to a dispute
might have  spent years in political  negotiations whereas now they will be able to avoid this
long period of negotiation through an expeditious proceeding at the WTO.  It may therefore
be that an increased frequency of recourse to the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism
will be combined with a shorter typical duration of dispute, perhaps leading to a net reduction
in  transactions  costs,  even  over  the  short  term.  With  respect  to  the  longer  term,  a
demonstration that trade rules will be enforced by the WTO Members might result  in a decline
in  the  frequency  of disputes,  as well  as  their duration.  That  is,  at the  moment,  rather
speculative.
In the  context of this conference,  the question arises whether  administered  barriers  to
trade are a substantial  enough component of GATT dispute settlements  such that reducing
the frequency  or duration of their disputes would have a significant effect  on transactions
costs within the GATT/WTO.
Bob  Hudec  has  compiled  a  statistical  profile  of all  GATT  dispute  settlement  cases
between  1948 and 1989.33  There were a total of 207 complaints filed during this period.  Of
these, 20 involved antidumping and countervailing duties, 33 involved  subsidies,  108 involved
non-tariff barriers (of which 26 involved discriminatory measures),  and 44 involved  tariffs (of
which  17  involved discriminatory measures).  Though certainly it will be useful to pursue a
more detailed inquiry into the individual cases underlying these statistics (which Hudec' s book
will allow us to do), it  seems clear as a general observation that a substantial proportion  of
GATT dispute settlement cases involved administered  barriers to trade.  If hard law rules are
successful in reducing the frequency or duration of such disputes, these rules should have a
significant impact on the transaction cost associated  with WTO dispute settlement.
Of course, it may be that transactions costs imposed by a single dispute involving a non-
administered barrier -- for example, a dispute involving a complaint challenging the formation
of a customs union or free trade area -- would be substantially higher than the transaction
costs of many disputes involving administered  barriers.  It is exceedingly difficult to compare
apples and oranges in this context; that is, to offer a prediction as to whether hard law rules
will have  a greater dollar  volume effect  on trade  disputes  involving  administered  or non-
administered barriers.  Such a determination would require us to be able to predict with some
33Robert Hudec, Enforcing International  Trade Law (1993),  pp. 273-366.
44degree of accuracy the type and intensity of disputes that will arise in the WTO,  and we do
not have an adequate basis for offering any predictions  in this regard.
In the final analysis, the intuitive assumption that a hard law dispute settlement  system is
more  likely  than  not  to  reduce transactions  costs  in  the  international  trading  system  is
probably correct,  though not without its difficulties.
The Economics of Certainty
A second question raised by the transition of the WTO from a soft to a hard law system
is  whether the more specific rules of the new system will improve productivity  within the
international trading system by reducing uncertainties about what constitutes compliance with
the rules.  Intuitively,  we  would  expect  that  reducing  governmental  and  private  costs
associated with ascertaining compliance  and reducing the frequency  of inter-governmental
disputes (as well as government vs. private enterprise disputes)  concerning  compliance would
increase production  efficiencies.
However,  the situation may occur in which an economy is over-regulated through clear
and certain rules.  If business enterprises spend too much time assuring regulatory  compliance
as compared with engaging in productive activity, then productivity  will suffer.  It does not
appear that the WTO is at the present time in danger of imposing a volume of rules that might
constitute  a  drag  on  international  economic  productivity.  However,  it  is  becoming
increasingly  likely that claims by Members that the WTO  is "over-regulating"  will become
more vocal as the WTO moves more forcefully into the areas of environmental,  labor, and
competition regulation.
In addition, while in some circumstances  economists may be satisfied to ignore the content
of rules,  e.g., in relation to calculating transaction costs, this is not true for all circumstances.
For example,  the new WTO Agreement on Subsidies is considerably more  specific than the
prior Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, but the new Agreement permits  subsidies in some cases
that the old Code did not.34  If trade economists  are in general agreement that subsidies  distort
efficiencies, then more specific  subsidies rules that expand the level of permissible subsidies
will  not have  a  positive  impact on  global wealth  creation.  It is therefore  not possible  to
postulate that more specific rules necessarily  lead to greater economic efficiencies  (consider,
for example,  a specific rule that quotas are permitted).
An economic hypothesis  with respect to specificity must be more narrowly defined.  We
might hypothesize:  if trade rules  are designed to result in the reduction of obstacles to trade
and if such rules are properly drafted, then more specific rules will in general be preferable to
less specific  rules because  this will facilitate  governmental  and private  party compliance,
resulting in a reduction in disputes and a lowering of transactions costs.
34For example, research and development  subsidies for specific industries.
45This hypothesis suggests that the content of rules makes a difference from the standpoint
of economic productivity.  This is  certainly the real world case  in which conditions of free
bargaining do not prevail.
Compliance with rules governing administered barriers should be enhanced by specificity.
However, the caveat previously mentioned will apply.  Specific rules may not be designed to
promote  a  reduction  in  administered  barriers  to  trade.  The  rule  permitting  multiple
interpretations of the Agreement  on Dumping may, for example, facilitate the inappropriate
application of antidumping laws.
To some extent,  the SPS Agreement provides  an example  of  hardening rules that may
increase  (or  at least not  decrease)  barriers to trade.  The  new  SPS  Agreement  is  rather
specific  in permitting Members  to individually  determine  the  level of health risk they are
willing to tolerate (e.g., in establishing their "appropriate level of protection"). 35  This  specific
rule, as well as a rule allowing measures that are "not more trade restrictive than required," 36
in place of an old rule requiring that measures be the "least restrictive to trade,"  are  designed
to permit Members to flexibly deal with social concerns.  As a statement of values, these rules
are laudable.  As an economic proposition, they may be inefficient.
A More Cautious World
Even if a hard legal system in the WTO enhances Member compliance  with rules, thereby
reducing disputes and increasing productive efficiencies,  there may yet be a reaction that over
the long term impacts  adversely on the system.  As Members  become more convinced that
new rules  will  be  enforced,  they  may become  more  hesitant  to  make  new  commitments
towards eliminating barriers.  The enforcement of rules may, in fact, have negative political
consequences for Member governments in their own territories.
It may be replied, of course, that if governments  are only willing to adopt rules that will
not be enforced,  this is no great economic benefit.  Therefore,  if Members elect to approach
rule-making  more cautiously,  but genuinely intend to comply with the rules, this may be a
positive result.  Nevertheless,  the forward  momentum  of the GATT was sustained  by the
willingness of its Members to compromise  on soft  commitments.  That momentum could be
lost in the transition to a hard law system.
The potential for resistance to commitments in respect to administered barriers to trade
must be evaluated in light of domestic political pressures that often underlay the adoption and
implementation of these measures.  Antidumping laws are the archetypal  administered  barriers
that exist largely to satisfy domestic political constituencies.  They lack a satisfactory basis
35SPS Agreement, art. 3:3, and note 2.
36Id.,  e.g.,  art. 5:6.
46in liberal trade theory.37  If politically powerful domestic constituencies  believed that a hard
law reform of the WTO Agreement  on Dumping might accomplish the purpose of reducing
the frequency of Antidumping/Countervailing  duty [AD/CVD]  disputes, the resistance to such
reforms might be intensified.
Hard  Law and  Heightened Conflict
Another variable in the transition from soft law to hard law is the potential that the hard
law system will escalate tensions  among Members.  Under the soft law system, a Member
could elect not to participate  in a dispute settlement proceeding,  or not to accept the result.
The new system has been designed without these safety valves.  The political consequences
of this restructuring are indeterminate.  I do not doubt the capacity of the WTO to fashion new
face-saving  devices to avoid the appearance of coercing Members.  Olivier Long was of the
view that the old system functioned well because of the spirit of compromise and consensus.
The new hard law system has yet to be tested.
WTO Member  governments  do not act in an ideal world  of disembodied  spirit.  Each
operates  at the interface of a domestic political arena and the international political  arena. The
domestic pressures  to reject an objectively reasonable  dispute  settlement  decision may be
great.  Pronouncing the  end of the soft  law  system and  achieving  that  reality  may be two
different matters.
Economics and  Public  Policy
The world does not live by economic efficiencies  alone.  In the US,  economic  policies
designed to enhance business efficiencies  may be taking a substantial toll on the social  fabric
of the nation.  As this paper is drafted during the first week of December  1995, the French
government faces a serious crisis resulting from its attempt to create efficiencies in its public
works sector.38  Whether hard legal rules increase the efficiency  of the multilateral  trading
system  is  but a  small  component  of the  broader  questions  that the  system  must  address.
Efficient rules may enhance production, but they will not automatically result in a reasonably
proportionate  distribution of  wealth in a world facing numerous distortions affecting the free
movement of resources and persons. The WTO and its Members face important social  welfare
choices in the areas of labor protection, environmental protection,  and others.  It would be
unwise to base these choices on economic  efficiencies  alone.
37Hudec,  Enforcing  International  Trade  Law,  p.  355, noting  "the typical  arbitrariness  of
AD/CVD  criteria"  may  lead  to the  frequent  failure  of GATT  settlement  procedures  in
AD/CVD disputes. 38N.  Y.  Times of  Dec. 5 regarding public workers'  strike.
47Extraneous Variables
There are two significant developments which will, in my view, impact the near to medium
term future of the WTO  in a more significant way than the success or failure of hard rules.
The first, which has been much discussed,  is the evolution of competing regional rule systems
that  threaten  the  integrity  and  supremacy  of the WTO  rule  system.  The  second  is  the
forthcoming  entrance of powerful new Members into the system.
The EU, the NAFTA,  Asian-Pacific  Economic Cooperation  [APEC] and the Mercosur
are  growing  increasingly  powerful.  The  number  of  countries  participating  in  these
arrangements  has grown substantially,  and membership  in these arrangements  has become a
virtual matter of necessity for many countries. The EU has shown a recent tendency to ignore
GATT rules and rulings in favor of regional rules and rulings.  The potential for the regional
systems to precipitate the disintegration of the WTO has been sufficiently  analyzed that I need
not belabor this matter here.  I note only that this is a problem that deserves continued  close
attention.
Perhaps even more important, the WTO will in the near to medium term incorporate the
PRC and Russia into its membership.  These countries lack the history of market economics
that has characterized the OECD, and yet they are great economic and political powers.  The
WTO is facing the prospect of no longer constituting an OECD-plus  club. The prospects  for
consensus  on important issues may soon be greatly diminished, and the WTO  may become
an organization ruled by majority, or super-majority,  rather than by consensus.  The potential
consequences of this shift should not be underestimated.  There are few, if any, examples  of
international  organizations that have functioned  as effectively as the GATT.  The GATT may
have functioned effectively because of its unique place in history.  We might hope that the
GATT functioned effectively because it was necessary to the economic well-being of modemrn
civilization, and that Members will perceive the WTO  as equally necessary to survival  and
prosperity.
Conclusions
The WTO is an exceptionally  complex arrangement,  from the economic,  political,  social
and legal perspectives,  and it is becoming more complicated.  The isolation of specific  rules
and results, and quantitative  analysis in particular cases,  is problematic.  UR negotiators  have
fashioned a new system of WTO legal rules more  specific than prior GATT  rules, and have
coupled these rules with seemingly more certain enforcement.  "All  other things being equal,"
this new  system  should  enhance  productivity  in  the  international  economy  and  stimulate
wealth creation.  Caution should  be exercised  in assuming the flow of human events  as a
constant.
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